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This paper argues that estimation of the Phillips curve for Japan should take account of 
the geographic dispersion of labor-market conditions.  We find evidence that the 
relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate is convex.  With such 
convexity, wage inflation can occur when unemployment rates across regions become 
more disperse, even if the aggregate unemployment rate is unchanged.  We show that 
controlling for the geographic dispersion of unemployment rates yields a flatter Phillips 
curve and a higher natural rate of unemployment. 
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I.  Introduction 
  Through the 1990s and beyond, the Japanese economy has experienced a 
period of low inflation accompanied by a steadily increasing unemployment rate (see 
Figure 1).  Given its somewhat anomalous nature, there has been a great deal of debate 
regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy in this situation.  In particular, a view 
held by many is that there is little-to-no tradeoff between inflation and unemployment 
at such low levels of inflation; i.e., the Japanese Phillips curve is non-linear and flattens 
out at low levels of inflation (See Nishizaki and Watanabe, 2000, for example).  A 
relatively loose monetary policy would, therefore, yield little additional inflation while 
reducing unemployment substantially.  Given this environment, it is not surprising that 
there has been renewed interest in the estimation of the Japanese Phillips curve 
(Nishizaki and Watanabe, 2000; Fukuda and Keida, 2001; Mio, 2001; Kuroda and 
Yamamoto, 2003c and 2005; Bank of Japan, 2003) 
    This paper presents new estimates of the Japanese Phillips curve following 
the approach suggested by Wall and Zoega (2004).  They argue that if there is a convex 
relationship between the labor-market conditions and wage inflation, then differences 
in labor-market conditions across states or regions matter when estimating aggregate 
Phillips curves.  The implication is that, when estimating the aggregate Phillips curve, it 
is not enough to include the aggregate level of slack in the labor market.  One should 
also include a measure of the geographic dispersion of labor-market slack.  When Wall 
and Zoega include such a measure in their empirical model of the U.S. Phillips curve, 
they find that doing so has a statistically significant effect.  Their most important 
finding was that a decrease in the dispersion of state-level labor-market slack accounted 
  1for a two-percentage-point decrease in the U.S. natural rate of aggregate unemployment 
between 1982 and 2002.  In addition, inclusion of their geographic-dispersion variable 
resulted in a flatter aggregate Phillips curve. 
  Regarding the Japanese Phillips curve, little attention has been paid previously 
to geographically disaggregated data.
1  Studies instead rely almost exclusively on 
aggregate variables, although some have also used industry disaggregates.  Exceptions 
to this are Nishizaki and Watanabe (2000) and Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005), which 
use a panel-data approach with data for prefectures and regions, respectively.  They 
harness the additional information provided by greater number of yearly observations 
to estimate the slope of the Japanese Phillips curve.  They do not, however, take account 
of the dispersion of conditions across prefectures, which is the main point of our 
estimation.  
  When estimating the aggregate Phillips curve, the geographic dispersion of 
labor-market slack will matter under two conditions.  The first condition is that there is 
a relationship between the aggregate business cycle and the dispersion of conditions 
across geographic entities—prefectures in the case of Japan.  The second condition is 
that the relationship between wage inflation and labor-market conditions is convex.  We 
address the first conditions for vacancy rates and unemployment rates below and the 
second condition in a separate section. 
  Figure 2 plots the aggregate unemployment rate and the dispersion of regional 
unemployment rates—as measured by their coefficient of variation—over the period 
1983-2002.  Note first that the aggregate unemployment rate does move somewhat with 
the business cycle, which indicate recessions in 1985-86, 1991-93, 1997-1999, and 
2000-2002, even though the Japanese unemployment rate is famously much less 
                                                 
1 See Fukuda and Keida (2001) for a review of the Japanese Phillips curve literature. 
  2responsive than those of other countries.
2   Also note that the two series tended to move 
together over time, having a simple correlation of -0.74.  In the 1980s, when the 
aggregate unemployment rate was low, the experience across regions was relatively 
disparate, but in the post-bubble era, regional unemployment rates became more similar 
to each other as aggregate unemployment rose nearly continuously throughout the 
period.
3   
  The correlation between aggregate labor-market conditions and sub-national 
dispersion is not immediately obvious from the vacancy rate data, however.  Figure 3 
plots the yearly Japanese vacancy rate and the coefficient of variation of prefectural 
vacancy rates over the period 1983-2002.
4  The aggregate vacancy rate did not, 
however, move consistently in the same direction with the coefficient of variation of 
prefectural vacancy rates.  During the bubble period of the late 1980s, aggregate 
vacancies rose dramatically while prefectural vacancy rates became more similar.  
Starting in the mid 1990s, however, prefectural vacancy rates became more similar in 
the face of a declining aggregate vacancy rate.  The correlation coefficient between the 
two series is –0.24, which indicates a rather weak relationship. 
  Section II describes the theoretical implications of a convex relationship 
between wage inflation and labor-market conditions, while Section III tests for this.  
After the two conditions are established, Section IV estimates Phillips curves using 
aggregate data supplemented with a measure of the dispersion of regional 
                                                 
2 For more-detailed explanations of trends in the Japanese labor market written in English, see Osawa et 
al (2002) and Fujiki, Nakada, and Tachibanaki (2001). 
3 This change over time is consistent with Wall (2007), who finds that regional business cycles became 
more similar to each other over the period 1976-2005. 
4 Vacancy data are not collected directly in Japan.  Instead, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare defines the number of vacancies in a period as the number of active openings minus the number 
of placements.  The vacancy rate is the number of vacancies divided by the sum of vacancies and 
employment.  Data on active openings and placements with prefectural breakdown are provided by the 
from various issues of Report on Employment Service issued by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare.  Employment by prefecture can be obtained from the Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts 
issued by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
  3unemployment rates.  The implications of these findings for the natural rate are 
explored in Section V.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical implications 
  If, at a disaggregated level, the relationship between labor-market slack and 
wage inflation is convex, cross-prefecture differences in slack over the business cycle 
can matter when estimating the link between the aggregate price level and the labor 
market.  One form of this convexity is downward nominal wage rigidity, which often is 
said to arise because managers are hesitant to cut wages because of considerations 
about worker morale (Bewley, 1999; Kawaguchi and Ohtake, 2004).  Wage cuts are 
likely to introduce personnel and incentive problems beyond the intended effect on 
turnover.  Indeed, there is strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in Japan 
(Kimura and Ueda, 2001; and Kuroda and Yamamoto, 2003a, 2003b), which is in line 
with similar evidence for the United States (Card and Hyslop, 1997; McLaughlin, 1999; 
and Bewley, 1999).
5  More recently, however, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005) find that 
downward nominal wage rigidity did not hold in Japan after 1997.   
  In general, as described in the classic Phelps (1968) paper outlining the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, convexity can arise when it is more difficult to 
reduce the nominal wage relative to expectations than it is to increase it.  If this is true, 
then there might be a role for using geographically disaggregated information to 
estimate aggregate inflation.  In Phelps (1968), wage inflation persists because firms 
cannot adjust instantaneously to changes in conditions.  For a given vacancy rate, wage 
inflation is decreasing in the unemployment rate, which indicates the size of the 
                                                 
5 Because the evidence regarding downwardly rigid wages points to a flat Phillips curve at very low 
inflation, much of the discussion in Japan has centered on whether or not to adopt an inflation target not 
insignificantly above zero.  See Otake (2001), for example.  According to Kuroda and Yamamoto 
(2003c), for example, the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity in Japan warrants an inflation target 
of at least 2.4 percent. 
  4available labor force.  Actual wage inflation equals expected wage inflation at a critical 
unemployment rate u .  For unemployment rates above u , there is unexpected wage 
deflation.  Conversely, for unemployment rates below u , there is unexpected wage 
inflation.  If firms are more reluctant to cut expected wages than to raise them—as the 
evidence suggests—the slope of the relationship between wage inflation and the 
unemployment rate is flatter above u  than it is below u .  In this model, therefore, the 
convexity of the relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate arises 
because of the different slopes above and below u .  A similar argument can be used to 
model possible convexity between wage inflation and the vacancy rate. 
  The potential importance of this convexity for aggregate inflation can be 
illustrated as follows:  Consider two equally sized regions with the same 
unemployment rate.  Now consider equal but opposite-signed changes in the regions’ 
unemployment rates (i.e., the changes are mean-preserving).  As this occurs, one region 
experiences wage inflation while the other experiences wage deflation.  Because of the 
convexity between wage inflation and the unemployment rate, the wage inflation 
experienced by one region is greater in absolute terms than the wage deflation 
experienced by the other.  In this example, therefore, there is wage inflation at the 
aggregate level even though there was no change in the aggregate unemployment rate.  
In general, then, with a strictly convex relationship between wage inflation and the 
unemployment rate, for any given aggregate unemployment rate, an increase in the 
dispersion of regional unemployment rates will mean higher aggregate wage inflation.  
Similarly, with a strictly convex relationship between wage inflation and the vacancy 
rate, aggregate wage-inflation rates should be increasing in the dispersion of regional 
vacancy rates. 
 
  5III.  Testing for convexity 
    Our next step is to test the hypothesis that the relationship between wage 
inflation and labor-market conditions is convex.  In the spirit of Phelps (1968), we 
consider both the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate, as do Wall and Zoega 
(2004).  We use a prefecture-level panel and the following regression equation:  
it t j jt jt it it i
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,         (1) 
where a subscript t indicates time and subscripts i and j indicate prefecture and region, 
respectively.
6  In equation (1), w denotes the wage,  0 α  is the common intercept,   is 
the prefectural fixed effect, τ is the time trend,  denotes the change in the wage, v 
denotes the vacancy rate, u is the unemployment rate, and π is the CPI inflation rate, 
which is lagged to control for inflation expectations.  Note that because unemployment 
data are available at the prefecture level beginning only in 1997, we used 
unemployment data at the regional level instead.  Also note that, because wage inflation 
should reflect changes in consumer prices regardless of the source of the change, we 
have not adjusted the CPI series to account for the change in the consumption tax rate in 





  In estimating equation (1), we use four different hourly wage measures 
derived from data provided by the Basic Survey on Wage Structure conducted by 
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare.  From this survey we use the data for full-time 
male employees in major industries on scheduled hours worked, overtime hours 
                                                 
6 The null hypothesis that   are the same across prefectures is rejected, which is not 
surprising given that we have only 20 observations per prefecture. 
2 1 2 1   and   , , , λ λ β β
7 See the appendix for the assignment of prefectures to regions. 
  6worked, contractual cash earnings,
8 and annual special cash earnings including bonus 
and term-end allowance paid in the previous year.
9   From these series, we construct our 
four wage measures: total wages per hour, total manufacturing wages per hour, 
contractual wages per hour, and contractual manufacturing wages per hour.
10  We used 
several different wage measures because there is some debate about which wage is 
appropriate.  For example, some studies, including Toyoda (1987), suggest that relevant 
wage measure should not include bonus payments (special cash earnings) because the 
wage changes in the Springtime Wage Increase focus on contractual cash earnings. 
  Because of data constraints, our wage measures the most favorable ones for 
our case.  We use full-time male wages because it is the most reliable series that is 
available at the prefecture level.  However, full-time males are likely to have the most 
rigid wages relative to other subgroups, especially part-time women, whose share of the 
workforce has been increasing over time.  An alternative wage measure that includes 
wages of all worker categories is available from Monthly Labor Survey, Prefectural 
Survey conducted by Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare.  It is not useful for our 
purposes, however, because the firms from which the survey is drawn is resampled 
periodically.  While adjustments for this resampling are provided for national data, they 
are not provided for prefectural data. 
  The results of our four estimations are summarized in Table 1.  Note first that 
the marginal effects of all of our right-hand-side variables always have the expected 
                                                 
8 Contractual cash earnings mean before-tax wages paid to employees, for the surveyed month of June, 
specified in advance in labor contracts, labor agreements, and/or working rules of establishments. 
9 Special wages including bonus and term-end allowance including (l) wages which are paid for 
temporary or unexpected reasons, not based upon agreements or rules established in advance and (2) 
wages paid in accordance with payment conditions and calculation methods already determined in labor 
agreements or working rules but paid based on a calculation period exceeding three months. They also 
include (3) wages paid under reason which are uncertain and (4) wages in back pay under a new labor 
agreement. 
10 Total wages include contractual cash earnings and annual special earnings, while total hours worked 
includes scheduled hours and overtime hours. 
  7signs and are almost always statistically different from zero:  In all four cases, wage 
inflation is positively related to the vacancy rate and negatively related to the 
unemployment rate.  Further, wage inflation is positively related to inflation 
expectations in all cases, and for three cases there is a positive time trend in wage 
inflation, capturing a positive trend in productivity. 
  Because for all cases the estimated coefficient on squared unemployment is 
negative and statistically significant, we conclude that there is strong evidence of a 
convex relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate.  On the other 
hand, although the sign of our estimates of the coefficient on the vacancy rate squared 
has the right sign to indicate convexity, for none of the cases is the coefficient 
statistically different from zero.  
  We should note that our above estimation is similar to the regional Phillips 
curve estimation of Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005), who found that a cubic specification 
of the relationship between wage inflation and unemployment is appropriate.  The key 
differences between our estimation and theirs is that, following Phelps (1968), we 
include the vacancy rate and a variable to control for inflation expectations.  They 
assume that the latter of these is controlled for by the combination of fixed effects and 
time dummies.  If we eliminate these two variables from our estimation, we also find 
support for a cubic specification. 
  
IV. The Japanese Phillips curve 
  Our results in the previous section indicate that there is a convex relationship 
between wage inflation and the unemployment rate, but not between wage inflation and 
the vacancy rate.  This evidence, along with our earlier evidence (see Figure 2) 
regarding the relationship over time between the aggregate unemployment rate and the 
  8dispersion of regional unemployment rates, suggests that the estimation of the 
aggregate Japanese Phillips curve might be improved by taking account of the regional 
dispersion of unemployment rates. 
  To test this supposition, we estimate a fairly standard Phillips curve: 
, ) ( t
e
t t t y f ε + ′ + ρπ + + α = π t Z δ      (2) 
where  is the average CPI inflation rate for years t and t+1, y t π t is a measure of 
labor-market slack,   is the expected inflation rate, Z is vector of variables to control 
for shocks, and ε is an error term.  We use both the unemployment rate and the active 
opening ratio as our labor-market slack variable.  Although the unemployment rate was 
the slack variable of choice in early studies of the Japanese Phillips curve (Toyoda, 
1972 and 1987), this was not the case in later studies because the labor hoarding 
resulting from Japanese long-term employment meant that the unemployment rate did 
not fluctuate much over the business cycle.
e
t π
11  As a result, more-recent studies have 
used the active opening ratio as their labor-market slack variable.   
  Consistent with most studies, we measure expected inflation with lagged 
inflation, which we average over years t-1 and t-2.
12  Our shock variables include the 
rate of depreciation of the yen against the dollar (averaged over years t and t+1) and 
trend productivity growth (trend growth of real GDP per employee).  These variables 
are denoted, respectively, by   and .  Our innovation is to include the coefficient  t E 
t d o Pr
                                                 
11 Kurosaka and Hamada (1982) and Hamada and Kurosaka (1984) also show that the Japanese Okun 
coefficient was high and unstable due to the labor hoarding based on Japanese long-term employment.  
Their conclusion still holds in the 1990s.  For example, Fujiki, Kuroda, and Tachibanaki (2001) showed 
the ordinary least square regression of the annual log employment rate computed from the official 
unemployment rate on a constant term, a time trend, and log GDP yields estimates of Okun coefficients 
ranging from 7.3 to 10 using the sample period of 1981-1999. See also Yoshikawa (2000) for review on 
Okun’s law in Japan.  
12 Toyoda (1987) used results of the Consumer Confidence Survey to control for expected inflation.  In 
the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate on a scale of one to five what they consider the prospects 
for the five subjects over the next six months.  Toyoda (1987) applies the method proposed by Carlson 
and Parkin (1975) to these survey data.  See the explanation of this survey at: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/stat/shouhi/qshohi_kaisetu-e.html. 
  9of variation of regional unemployment rates, CVt, as an additional shock variable to 
explain changes in the rate of aggregate inflation.  Whereas the other shock variables 
control for the movement of the macroeconomy, CVt measures the dispersion of 
regional unemployment rates.  This variable controls for the possibility that, because of  
convexity and non-uniform changes in regional unemployment rates, there is a 
misreading of the link between the aggregate conditions and the aggregate price level 
(see Section II).  
  Our specification is therefore  
, ) ( 3 2 1 t t t t
e
t t t CV d o Pr E y f ε + δ + δ + δ + ρπ + + α = π           (3) 
which we estimate using, in turn, the unemployment rate and the active opening ratio as 
our slack variable yt.  For each case we also use linear and quadratic functional forms 
for  .  Finally, for each variable and each functional form, we estimate (3) first 
under the restriction that δ
) ( t y f
3 = 0 (i.e., that CVt does not matter) and then without this 
restriction.   
  A problem when estimating the Phillips curve for Japan—and to a slightly 
lesser extent, the United States—is the pooling of periods of very high inflation (the 
1970s) and very low inflation (the 1990s).  An oft-used solution for the case of Japan is 
the use of dummy variables for the high-inflation years of the 1970s and early 1980s.  
While such a solution can handle difference in the intercept, it still assumes that the 
coefficient on the slack variable is the same across the periods.  Nishizaki and Watanabe 
(2000), on the other hand, are interested in potential non-linearities in the Phillips curve, 
so their innovative solution is to allow for a kink, which they find to occur most 
plausibly at around 3 percent.  Our solution is simply to restrict our analysis to the 
post-1982 period, during which inflation ranged between –0.7 and 3.3 percent.  
Because the period includes only one year of inflation above 3 percent, we need not be 
  10concerned with the severe non-linearities that Nishizaki and Watanabe were controlling 
for.   
A. Phillips Curve I: Unemployment Rate 
  Our estimates of the Phillips curve using the unemployment rate as the slack 
variable are presented in Table 2.  For both specifications that do not include the CVt 
variable, the estimation works well in the sense that all estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs and are almost always statistically significant.  The quadratic 
specification performs the best in terms of goodness of fit, although both perform 
respectably by this standard. 
  For both specifications, inclusion of the CVt variable has the expected effects:  
The estimated effect of an increase in the dispersion of regional unemployment rates is 
positive and the Phillips curve is flatter than otherwise.  A likelihood-ratio test rejects 
the null that the restriction that the effect of the quadratic term is zero does not affect the 
overall estimation (i.e., the quadratic specification is preferred).  Finally, in the 
preferred quadratic specification the estimated coefficient on CVt statistically different 
from zero, although a likelihood-ratio test does not reject the hypothesis that inclusion 
of CVt has no effect on the overall estimation.   
  Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the Phillips curve with and without 
CVt.  The two Phillips curves are derived by substituting the 2002 values for all 
variables except for the unemployment rate into (3) using the respective coefficient 
estimates from the quadratic specification in Table 2.  As mentioned above, inclusion of 
CVt results in a flatter Phillips curve, particularly at high rates of unemployment, and 
indicates a higher zero-inflation unemployment rate (i.e., a higher “natural” rate of 
unemployment).  This latter point is explored in more detail in Section V. 
  11B. Phillips Curve II: Active Opening Rate 
  As mentioned above, most early studies of the Japanese Phillips curve do not 
use the unemployment rate as the slack variable.  This is because the Phillips curve 
usually “doesn’t work” when the unemployment rate is used, a result that is attributed 
to the fact that the unemployment rate in Japan is not nearly as sensitive to the business 
cycle as it is in other countries.  The active opening rate—the ratio of active job 
openings to active applications—shows more movement over the business cycle than 
does the unemployment rate.  It is, therefore, typically used instead of the 
unemployment rate when labor-market slack is of most interest, as it is presently.  Even 
though our estimates using the unemployment rate work fairly well for the traditional 
variables, we perform the same exercise using the active opening rate. 
  Our results using the active opening rate are presented in Table 3.  For both 
specifications that do not include the CVt variable, the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs.  All are statistically significant, except for those in the quadratic 
specification.  Further, the linear specification of the active opening rate performs the 
best in terms of goodness of fit.  For both specifications, inclusion of the CVt variable 
flattens the Phillips curve, as it did in the previous case using the unemployment rate as 
the slack variable.  Also, the estimated effect of an increase in the dispersion of 
prefectural vacancy rates is positive and statistically significant.  For both 
specifications a log-likelihood test rejects the hypothesis that inclusion of CVt has no 
effect on the overall estimation.   
  In sum, the specifications of the Phillips curve that include CVt are preferred 
statistically to those that do not, and inclusion of CVt leads to a somewhat flatter 
Phillips curve.  This is illustrated by Figure 5, in which the Phillips curves with and 
without CVt are derived in the same manner as those in Figure 4.  Note also that, at least 
  12for 2002, the “natural” active opening rate (the active opening rate that is consistent 
with zero inflation) is slightly higher when CVt is included, indicating less inflationary 
pressure than does the alternative. 
 
V. “Natural” Rates 
  We showed in the previous section that a model of the Phillips curve that 
controls for the dispersion of unemployment rates across regions is preferred 
statistically to an otherwise identical model that does not.  In this section, we will 
demonstrate the economic significance of the dispersion of regional unemployment 
rates in terms of its effect on the “natural” rate of unemployment (NRU) the “natural” 
active opening rate (NAOR).  Because natural rates are useful benchmarks for 
determining whether or not the situation in labor markets is inflationary, our results 
have implications for monetary policy.   
 
A. Natural Rate of Unemployment 
  Solve (3) for when  = 0, y
e
t t π = π t is the unemployment rate, and 
 to obtain NRU 2











δ + δ + δ + α θ − θ ± θ −
=
t t t CV d o Pr E  
   (4) 
We calculate (4) using the relevant coefficients from Table 2 and the trend values for 
.  Of course, this yields two distinct series, one of which we rule out 
on the grounds that it is consistently above the highest actual unemployment in the 
sample.  Figure 6 illustrates the movement of estimated trend NRU during 1983-2002 
t t t CV d o Pr E   and   ,   ,  
  13when CVt is included and when it is not.
13  The thick black line is the trend NRU from 
the model that includes CVt  and the thick gray line is the trend NRU when CVt  is not 
included.  For reference, the figure also includes the actual unemployment rate as a 
dashed gray line.   
  As mentioned previously, the model that includes CVt  yields a slightly higher 
raw NRU for 2002 than does the model without CVt .  This is apparent in Figure 6 
which shows that the difference in trend NRU between the two versions of the model in 
2002 (3.4 versus 3.2) is the smallest for all of the years in our sample.  In the earliest 
years of the sample, the difference was around a full percentage point.  Over time, the 
difference between the two estimates of NRU fell along with the dispersion of 
labor-market conditions across regions (see Figure 2).  In terms of the monetary policy 
implications, our findings consistently indicate a less-inflationary environment when 
the geographic dispersion of unemployment rates is controlled for.  
  Our model indicates also that the NRU has been falling over time, whereas the 
alternative model suggests that it has been rising along with the actual unemployment 
rate.
14  Our results in this regard are contrary to what most observers of the Japanese 
economy, who do not account for geographic dispersion, believe has been happening.  
To understand our result, assume that the economy starts at the aggregate NRU, 
meaning that inflation is zero.  If, during the next period, prefectural unemployment 
rates converge without there being an increase in aggregate unemployment, inflation 
would fall below zero (due to convexity).  Thus, because of this convergence effect, the 
new NRU must be lower than the old one.  Our finding is that the trend NRU has been 
                                                 
13 We obtain trend levels by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the raw series. 
14 For example, Chart 27 in White Paper on Labor Economy, Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare 2005 shows a series of NRU estimated from U-V analyses.  The NRU estimated in that way 
increased between the middle of the 1990s and 2003.  
  14falling over time because the convergence effect has been dominating other factors that 
may have been working to raise the NRU. 
 
B. Natural Active Opening Rate 
  Solve (3) for when  , y 0 = π = π
e
t t t is the active opening rate, and  .  
This yields NAOR
t t y y f 1 ) ( θ =
t, the time-varying natural active opening rate: 
. / ) ( NAOR 1 3 2 1 t θ δ + δ + δ + α − = t t t CV d o Pr E               (5) 
We calculate (5) using the relevant coefficients from Table 3 and the trend values for 
.  When the actual active opening rate is above NAOR the economy 
faces inflationary pressures.  Figure 7 illustrates the movement over 1983-2002 of 
estimated trend NAOR with and without accounting for CV
t t t CV d o Pr E   and   ,   ,  
t .  The thick black line is the 
trend NAOR from the model that includes CVt and the thick gray line is trend NAOR 
from the model that does not include CVt .  For reference, the figure also includes the 
actual active opening rate (AOR) as a dashed gray line.   
  Note that the trend NAOR that controls for CVt  rises throughout our sample 
period, indicating an increasingly less-inflationary environment for any given actual 
active opening rate, much as we found when we used the unemployment rate as the 
slack variable.  For 2002, because the actual opening rate is below either trend NAOR, 
there is deflationary pressure, which clearer from the trend NAOR that controls for CVt. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
  The central point of this paper is that studies of the Phillips curve for Japan 
should take account of changes in the geographic dispersion of labor-market slack.  Our 
first evidence of this is from our prefecture-level panel estimation in which we show 
that there is a convex relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate.  
  15We then show that controlling for the dispersion of regional unemployment rates yields 
a flatter Phillips curve and a higher natural rate than we obtain when we ignore regional 
dispersion.  
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  Appendix: Japanese Regions and Their Prefectures 
Hokkaido 
  1 Hokkaido
Tohoku 
  2 Aomori  
  3 Iwate  
  4 Akita  
  5 Miyagi  
  6 Yamagata  
  7 Fukushima  
Northern Kanto 
  8 Ibaraki  
  9 Tochigi  
  10 Gumma  
  18 Nagano
  21 Yamanashi
Southern Kanto 
  11 Chiba  
  12 Saitama  
  13 Tokyo  
  14 Kanagawa  
Hokuriku 
  15 Niigata  
  16 Toyama  
  17 Ishikawa
  20 Fukui
Tokai  
  19 Gifu  
  22 Shizuoka
  23 Aichi




  24 Shiga
  25 Kyoto  
  26 Hyogo  
  28 Nara  
  29 Osaka  
  30 Wakayama
Chugoku 
  31 Tottori  
  32 Shimane  
  33 Okayama
  34 Hiroshima  
  35 Yamaguchi
Shikoku 
  36 Kagawa  
  37 Tokushima  
  38 Ehime  
  39 Kochi  
Kyushu 
  40 Fukuoka  
  41 Saga  
  42 Nagasaki  
  43 Oita  
  44 Kumamoto  
  45 Miyazaki  
  46 Kagoshima  
  47 Okinawa  
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Table 1. Testing for Convexity with a Panel of Prefectures 
 
 











wages per hour 
Prefectural 
vacancy rate (β1) 
  1.167*  
[0.582]   
(2.01) 
  1.119* 
[0.727]   
(1.54) 
 0.559  
[0.620]   
(0.90) 
0.542   





0.089   
[0.109]   
(0.82) 
0.122   
[0.136]   
(0.90) 
0.100   
[0.116]   
(0.86) 
0.089   






[0.460]   
(4.21) 
 -1.789* 
[0.574]   
(3.12) 
 -1.864* 
[0.489]   
(3.81) 
 -1.638* 




rate squared (λ2) 
  0.155* 
[0.052]   
(3.00) 
0.135* 
[0.064]   
(2.10) 
  0.123* 
[0.055]   
(2.24) 
 0.114* 
[0.069]   
(1.64) 
Lagged regional 
inflation rate (ω) 
  0.529*  
[0.085]   
(6.24) 
  0.606* 
[0.106]   
(5.73) 
  0.682* 
[0.090]   
(7.55) 
  0.894*  
[0.114]   
(7.86) 
Trend (τ) -0.006   
[0.018]   
(0.35) 
 0.053*   
[0.022]   
(2.41) 
 0.041*   
[0.019]   
(2.20) 
  0.087*   




  3.507* 
[1.417]   
(2.47) 
2.508   
[1.769]   
(1.42) 
  4.353* 
[1.509]   
(2.88) 
  3.138*   
[1.900]   
(1.65) 
R
2 within   0.519  0.379  0.448  0.305 
R
2 between   0.128  0.007  0.116  0.009 
R
2  total  0.403 0.271 0.362 0.245 
F(6,887)  159.27 90.38 119.97 64.72 
Least squares estimation with prefectural fixed effects.  Each regression uses 940 
observations from 47 prefectures over 20 years (1983-2002).  Numbers in brackets are 
standard errors while those in parentheses are absolute t-statistics.  A “*” indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level. 





Table 2. The Japanese Phillips Curve I: Slack Variable = Unemployment Rate 
  Linear Quadratic 









  -2.992* 
[0.917] 
(3.26) 






Inflation expectations (ρ)    0.217* 
[0.094] 
(2.31) 









Yen depreciation (δ1)    0.062* 
[0.010] 
(6.04) 
  0.061* 
[0.010] 
(6.23) 
  0.060* 
[0.009] 
(6.66) 
  0.059* 
[0.009] 
(6.72) 












CV of regional unemployment 
rates (δ3)  _  7.069 
[5.139] 
(1.38) 
_    9.023* 
[4.247] 
(2.12) 






  5.892* 
[1.905] 
(3.09) 




2 0.841 0.850 0.883 0.897 
Root  MSE  0.526 0.529 0.467 0.454 
Log likelihood  -12.636  -12.071  -9.574  -8.298 
Likelihood ratio
a   1.130  2.552 
White-corrected standard errors are in brackets and absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.  
An ‘*’ indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  Each regression has 20 
observations for 1983-2002.   
a The null hypothesis is that a zero restriction on the coefficient on the CV of regional 
unemployment rates does not affect the other coefficient estimates.  This is cannot be 
rejected for either specifications.  The critical value at the 10 percent level is 2.71. 
 




Table 3. The Japanese Phillips Curve II: Slack Variable = Active Opening Rate 
  Linear Quadratic 
Active opening rate (θ1)    1.990* 
[0.342] 
(5.83) 





















  0.486* 
[0.076] 
(6.38) 
  0.401* 
[0.069] 
(5.80) 
Yen depreciation (δ1)     0.060* 
[0.010] 
(5.94) 
  0.057* 
[0.009] 
(6.29) 
  0.060* 
[0.011] 
(5.66) 
  0.057* 
[0.009] 
(6.40) 






  0.952* 
[0.246] 
(3.87) 
  0.044* 
[0.446] 
(0.10) 
CV of regional unemployment 
rates (δ3)   _    11.038* 
[4.125] 
(2.68) 
_   11.143* 
[4.186] 
(2.72) 













2 0.880 0.904 0.880 0.904 
Root  MSE  0.458 0.423 0.473 0.438 
Log  likelihood  -9.865 -7.623 -9.856 -7.577 
Likelihood ratio
a   4.484*  4.558* 
White-corrected standard errors are in brackets and absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.  
An ‘*’ indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  Each regression has 20 
observations for 1983-2002.   
a The null hypothesis is that a zero restriction on the coefficient on the CV of regional 
unemployment rates does not affect the other coefficient estimates.  This is rejected for both
specifications.  The critical value at the 10 percent level is 2.71. 
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1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Actual Active 
Opening Rate
Trend NAOR 
with CV
Trend NAOR 
without CV
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